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I. INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act ("the Act") consists of
seven sections and takes up exactly one and one half pages of text in the
standard statute textbooks. Despite its brevity, the Act has been the
subject of an incredible number of cases in recent years. Illinois courts
of review have attempted to clarify the many standards and procedural
safeguards set forth in the Act. The language in some of the decisions
of the Illinois Supreme Court, however, has led to conflicting
interpretations of the standards and procedures of the Act by Illinois
appellate courts. These conflicting interpretations, in turn, have
increasingly burdened the trial courts, which must often review a
defendant's post-conviction claim years after his or her original
conviction.
This Article will attempt to analyze the impact of recent court
decisions upon proceedings under the Act. This Article will focus on
the Act itself and the case law interpreting the standards and procedures
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1. The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 to 122-8 (2000).
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set forth in the Act.2  The authors will attempt to clarify apparent
conflicts in the case law and suggest a framework for analyzing cases in
this area. 3 This Article will also discuss the procedural stages under the
Act4 and how the doctrines of res judicata and waiver affect the courts'
review of post-conviction petitions. 5 Finally, this Article will discuss
several recurring issues that are routinely raised by defendants seeking
post-conviction relief.
6
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a mechanism by
which those under criminal sentence in Illinois can assert that their
convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under
the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both.7 "Post-
conviction relief is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the
underlying judgment."8  "All issues decided on direct appeal are res
judicata, and all issues that could have been raised in the original
proceeding but were not are waived." 9
2. See infra Parts 11-111 (providing an overview of the Act and the timeliness requirement as
set forth in the Act). Other avenues of collateral review such as state habeas corpus (735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/10-101 (2000)) and relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 (2000)) are not discussed in this Article.
3. See infra Part II.D (suggesting a framework for analyzing post-conviction case law).
4. See infra Parts IV-VI (examining the three stages in post-conviction hearings).
5. See infra Part VII (discussing the issues of res judicata, waiver, and successive petitions in
post-conviction hearings).
6. See infra Part VII (highlighting recurring issues in post-conviction proceedings).
7. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(a) (2000); People v. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Il1. 2001).
See also People v. West, which states:
To invoke post-conviction relief, the statutory language requires that an individual be
"imprisoned in the penitentiary." However, as has been determined by this court, actual
incarceration is not a strict prerequisite. This language has been held to include
defendants who have been released from incarceration after the timely filing of their
petition (People v. Davis (1968), 39 I11. 2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634), released on appeal
bond following conviction (People v. Martin-Trigona (1986), 111 111. 2d 295, 95 Ill.
Dec. 492, 498 N.E.2d 1356), released under mandatory supervision (People v. Correa
(1985), 108 I11. 2d 541, 92 Ill. Dec. 492, 428 N.E.2d 1356), and sentenced to probation
(People v. Montes (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 355, 45 Ill. Dec. 639, 412 N.E.2d 1158).
People v. West, 584 N.E.2d 124, 125 (111. 1991).
8. People v. Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d 369, 372 (11. 2001) (citing People v. Evans, 708
N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (111. 1999)).
9. Id. (citing People v. Whitehead, 662 N.E.2d 1304, 1311-12 (Il. 1996)). There are
circumstances, however, where the waiver rule will be relaxed. See infra Part VII (discussing
waiver).
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A. Commencement and Review of a Post-Conviction Proceeding
The filing of a petition in the circuit court in which the original
proceeding took place commences post-conviction proceedings under
the Act.10 "The petition must clearly set forth the respects in which the
petitioner's constitutional rights were violated."'1 1 "The petition shall
have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting
its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached."12
After the post-conviction petition is filed, the Act provides for three
levels, or stages, of review. In the first stage of review, the court may
summarily dismiss a petition of a non-capital defendant within ninety
days if the petition is "frivolous or is patently without merit."13 If the
petition is not summarily dismissed, the court dockets the petition and
proceeds to the second stage. 14
At the second stage, counsel is appointed on behalf of indigent
petitioners to review and, if necessary, to amend the petition. The State
must file an answer or move to dismiss the petition within thirty days
(or within such further time as the court may set) from the date the case
was docketed pursuant to section 122-2.1(b). 15  The court must then
determine whether the petition and the accompanying documentation
set forth a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. 16 If the
court determines that the petition does not make a substantial showing
of a constitutional violation, the court may dismiss the petition during
this second stage. 17 If a substantial showing is made, the petition then
advances to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an
evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of the petitioner's claim.18
"If the trial court dismisses the petition or denies post-conviction
relief at any stage, the defendant may appeal."' 19 The standard of review
for summary dismissals is de novo.20 The manifest error standard,
10. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1; People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (Ill. 1998).
I1. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1071; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2 (stating the
requirements for a post-conviction petition).
12. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.
13. Id. § 5/122-2.1(a)(2); Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1071.
14. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(b).
15. Id. § 5/122-5; see also id. § 5/122-2.1(b) (mandating that a court order a "petition to be
docketed for further consideration in accordance with" section 122-5 if the petition is not
dismissed).
16. Id. § 5/122-2.1(b).
17. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1071.
18. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-6; see also People v. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (I11.
1996) (explaining the three stages of a post-conviction proceeding).
19. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d at 106-07.
20. People v. Barrow, 749 N.E.2d 892, 902 (III.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
however, is applicable when reviewing orders granting or denying relief
are made after an evidentiary hearing.2 1  The State may appeal the
granting of a defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, as it is a
final judgment on a civil matter. 22
B. Miscellaneous Provisions of the Act
1. Presence of the Defendant
Section 122-6 of the Act provides: "In its discretion the court may
order the petitioner brought before the court for the [post-conviction]
hearing. '"23 The decision to have an inmate present at the hearing on his
petition for post-conviction relief is within the sound discretion of the
hearing judge, and only a clear abuse of discretion or the application of
impermissible legal standards will justify reversal of such a decision.24
2. Post-Conviction Judge
Originally, section 122-8 ostensibly required that the judge who
reviewed the petition for post-conviction relief be someone other than
the judge who presided at the original proceedings. 25 In 1986, the
Illinois Supreme Court found this provision to be unconstitutional.26
Today, the same judge who presided over the defendant's trial should
hear his post-conviction petition, unless it is shown that the defendant
would be substantially prejudiced. 27 Thus, defendants do not have an
absolute right to substitution of a judge at a post-conviction proceeding,
but rather they must show that they will be substantially prejudiced if
the motion for substitution is denied.28
21. See Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1073; see also People v. Scott, 742 N.E.2d 287, 293 (I11.
2000) (applying the manifestly erroneous standard to uphold a post-conviction judge's ruling),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 873 (2001).
22. People v. Andretich, 614 N.E.2d 489, 491 (11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1993).
23. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-6.
24. People v. Collins, 619 N.E.2d 871, 874 (11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1993).
25. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-8 (1984) ("All proceedings under this Article shall he
conducted and all petitions shall be considered by a judge who was not involved in the original
proceeding which resulted in conviction.").
26. People v. Joseph, 495 N.E.2d 501, 507 (111. 1986) (holding section 122-8 of the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act unconstitutional).
27. People v. Madej, 685 N.E.2d 908, 931 (I11. 1997), overruled by People v. Coleman, 701
N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (I11. 1998) (holding that the standard of review is now plenary); see also
People v. Wright, 723 N.E.2d 230, 239-40 (Il1. 2000) (explaining when a judge must recuse
himself in a post-conviction proceeding), overruled by People v. Boclair, 202 Il1. 2d 89 (2002)
(holding that a circuit court may summarily dismiss untimely petitions in the initial phase of post-
conviction hearing).
28. People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335, 1346 (I11. 1997).
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C. Legislative History of Section 122-2.1: 1983 and 1989
In 1983, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 83-942, amending
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act by adding section 122-2.1.29 The
amendment added the first level of review, the summary dismissal
stage. Public Act 83-942 provides:
(a) Within 30 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the
court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon
pursuant to this Section. If the court determines the petition is
frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition
in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions
of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is
a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by
certified mail within 10 days of its entry.
(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court
shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in
accordance with sections 122-4 through 122-6.
(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court may
examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner
was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such
proceeding and any transcripts of such proceeding.
30
The Illinois General Assembly amended the newly created section
122-2.1 in 1989.31 As a result of the 1989 amendment, the statute now
29. Act of Nov. 23, 1983, Pub. Act 83-942, § 122.21, 1983 I11. Laws 6200, 6201 (codified as
amended at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1 (2000)).
30. Id.
31. Act of Sept. 1, 1989, Pub. Act 86-655, § 122-2.1, 1989 I11. Laws 3588, 3588 (codified as
amended at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1 (2000)). Public Act 86-655 amended section 122-
2.1 as follows:
(a) Within 30 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall
examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.
(1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is without counsel
and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or
not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is
so requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no
means to procure counsel.
(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and if the court
determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the
petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it
made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be
served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.
(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order
the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4
through 122-6.
(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court may examine the
court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by
an appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such proceedings.
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provides that the trial court must appoint counsel to assist a petitioner in
preparing a petition if the petitioner lacks funds to procure counsel and
the post-conviction petitioner is under a sentence of death.32  "The
amendment also created section 122-2.1 (a)(2), which currently provides
that if a petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the trial court
determines that the petition is 'frivolous' or 'patently without merit,' the
trial court shall dismiss the petition." 33
The Illinois Supreme Court discussed the import of the 1983
amendment in People v. Rivera.34 In Rivera, the court noted that, after
the 1983 amendment, petitioners were no longer entitled to the
assistance of counsel in drafting their post-conviction petitions. 35 When
a petitioner, whether under sentence of death or not, filed a post-
conviction petition, the trial court was directed to determine whether the
petition was "frivolous" or "patently without merit."36
The Illinois Supreme Court also recently addressed a constitutional
challenge to the 1983 and 1989 amendments in People v. Boclair.37 In
Boclair, the defendants challenged Public Act 83-942 as violating the
single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution.38 The defendants based
their claim on the title of Public Act 83-942, which indicates it relates to
Id. (emphasis in original to indicate amendments to section 122-2.1).
32. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.l(a)(1) (2000); People v. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Il.
2001). The Rivera court discussed the importance of the 1989 amendment. The court stated:
Therefore, after January i, 1990, a trial court could no longer dismiss a capital
litigant's petition on the basis of frivolity. However, noncapital litigants still had to
survive the trial court's frivolity determination in order to further proceed under the
Act and to receive the appointment of counsel if the petitioner lacked funds to procure
counsel.
Rivera, 763 N.E.2d at 309; see also People v. Brisbon, 647 N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ill. 1995)
(discussing the Act's differing procedures for prisoners sentenced to death and those sentenced to
imprisonment).
33. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d at 309; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (allowing
dismissal of a frivolous or patently meritless petition if the petitioner is sentenced to
imprisonment).
34. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d at 309.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Rivera court went on to note:
Thus, the biggest change wrought to the Act by virtue of the 1983 amendment was that
counsel was appointed to an indigent petitioner only after the court initially reviewed
the petition and only if the court did not dismiss the petition on the ground of frivolity.
Also, the State was permitted to answer or move to dismiss the petition only after the
court made an order pursuant to section 122-2.1.
Id.
37. People v. Boclair, 202 I11. 2d 89 (2002).
38. Id. at 108; see also ILL. CONST. 1970 art. IV, § 8(d) (requiring that "[b]ills, except bills for
appropriations and for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to
one subject").
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matters of criminal justice and correctional facilities. 39 The defendants
argued that criminal justice and correctional facilities were two separate
subjects and, therefore, could not be addressed in one act.40  Every
Illinois appellate court panel that had considered the issue had rejected
similar arguments.4 1
The Illinois Supreme Court similarly rejected this argument. 42 The
court stated that the subject of criminal justice and correctional facilities
both relate to the proper subject of the criminal justice system. 43 The
court went on to conclude that "the definition of 'criminal justice
system' includes substantive criminal law, as well as all matters
concerning corrections. '" 44
D. Suggested Framework for Analyzing Post-Conviction Case Law
The 1983 and 1989 amendments to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
radically changed how the courts address newly filed petitions by
requiring courts to dismiss frivolous or meritless petitions. When
reviewing summary dismissals entered pursuant to these amendments,
the analysis employed by opinions written prior to the existence of the
amendments may not be particularly illuminating. Consequently, the
authors believe that opinions issued prior to the 1983 amendments are
of limited value.
By their very nature, post-conviction proceedings are extremely fact-
intensive. As a result, many of the decisions of Illinois courts of review
facially appear to be in conflict with one another. With this in mind, the
best way to analyze any factual situation facing a trial court in a post-
conviction proceeding is to rely on the language of the statute and to
keep in mind the procedural position or stage that the case is in when
the trial court is reviewing the petition. The procedural position of the
case and the language of the pertinent section of the Act will determine
the analysis employed by a court reviewing the decision made by a trial
court.
39. Boclair, 202 I1. 2d at 109 (noting that the title of Public Act 83-942 is "An Act in relation
to criminal justice and correctional facilities").
40. Id.
41. Id. at 108 (citing People v. Sharpe, 749 N.E.2d 432, 434 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2001);
People v. Vilces, 748 N.E.2d 1219, 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001)); People v. Dorris, 746
N.E.2d 303, 307-08 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2001); People v. Roberts, 743 N.E.2d 1025, 1037 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000).
42. Boclair, 202 I11.2d at 113-14.
43. Id. at 110.
44. Id. at 112-13 (citing People v. Dixon, 721 N.E.2d 1172, 1177 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1999)); Dorris, 746 N.E.2d at 307.
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In addition, it is important to remember that the 1989 amendment,
adding section 122-2.1 (a)(1), does not allow the trial court to summarily
dismiss capital cases.45 Since the majority of post-conviction petitions
reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court are capital cases, most of these
cases are dismissed at the second stage in the trial courts. The authors
believe the applicability of these cases to the summary dismissal stage is
questionable unless the Illinois Supreme Court specifically addresses
section 122-2.1(a)(2), relating to summary dismissal. 46  Decisions
addressing dismissals at the second stage should not be relied upon
when considering the appropriateness of summary dismissals entered
prior to counsel being appointed for the petitioner. Accordingly, when
this Article cites an Illinois Supreme Court case in its discussion of
summary dismissals, it will note whether the case was a capital or a
non-capital case. 47
III. SECTION 122-1 (c): TIMELINESS
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act sets forth time limits within which
a defendant must file his or her original petition. Section 122-1(c)
provides:
No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6
months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for
filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the
defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the
Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for
filing of the defendant's brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no
brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is
sooner,.unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was
not due to his or her culpable negligence.48
"The statute of limitations applicable to the defendant is the statute in
effect at the time he filed his post-conviction petition." 49
45. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (2000); see supra note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing that the statute provides for those sentenced to death the opportunity to have counsel
appointed at this stage before summary dismissal).
46. See People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1070-71 (I11. 1998) (addressing section 122-
2.1(a)(2) in a capital case).
47. Indications of whether the case is capital or non-capital will be in the form of a
parenthetical.
48. Coleman, 701-71 N.E.2d at 1070 (emphasis added).
49. People v. Allen, 750 N.E.2d 257, 259 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) (citing People v. Bates,
529 N.E.2d 227, 228-29 (Ill. 1988)). In addition to which statute of limitations is applicable,
People v. Allen also discussed the effect of the United States Supreme Court's denial of a
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari and whether the petition for rehearing on the denial of
certiorari begins the limitations period. Id.; see also People v. Reed, 706 N.E.2d 1059, 1060-61
[Vol. 34
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The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently addressed the issue of
when the time period commences under section 122-1(c). In People v.
Hager,50 the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault against two victims less than thirteen years of
age and sentenced to two consecutive forty-year terms of imprisonment
in 1991.51 In 1994, the appellate court affirmed the convictions but
remanded the case for resentencing.52  On remand, the circuit court
resentenced the defendant to two consecutive thirty-five year terms of
imprisonment. 53 The appellate court affirmed the new sentences in
February 1997. 54
In October 1997, the defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition
alleging a violation of his constitutional rights at trial.55 "[The trial]
court summarily dismissed [the] defendant's petition, finding it to be
'without merit.' The appellate court affirmed the dismissal ... but not
on the basis that the petition was patently without merit. Instead, the
appellate court determined that [the] defendant's petition was not filed
timely." 56
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court held that the six-
month limitation period applied and began to run following the
defendant's first appeal in 1994. 57 "The appellate court determined that
it did not matter if [the] defendant was not technically or finally
'convicted' until ... 1997, when the appellate court affirmed the
sentences .... ."58 "[T]he appellate court concluded that [the] defendant
could have raised nonsentencing issues, including the issue raised in the
case, in a post-conviction petition while 'the sentencing issue was being
resolved in the trial court."' 59
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's analysis and
held that the limitation period did not begin to run until after the
defendant's sentences were vacated in the first appeal.6 ° In reaching
this conclusion, the court looked at its prior decision in People v.
(I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1999) (discussing the limitation period set forth in the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act).
50. People v. Hager, 780 N.E.2d 1094 (111. 2002).
51. Id. at 1095.
52. Id. at 1094.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1095.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1095-96.
59. Id. at 1096.
60. id. at 1097.
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Woods,61 holding that the word "conviction," as used in the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act, "is a term of art, which means a final judgment
that includes both a conviction and a sentence." 62 Because the appellate
court vacated the defendant's sentences in 1994, he did not stand
"convicted" for purposes of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.63
The Illinois Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of whether
the timeliness provisions of section 122-1(c) are jurisdictional or
whether they are akin to a statute of limitations period, which can be
waived. In People v. Wright,64 the court held that "the time limitation
found in section 122-1 [(c)] ... has more in common with statutes of
limitations than it does with statutes conferring jurisdiction." 65  The
timing requirements are in the nature of a limitation provision that can
be waived through procedural default.66 By failing to raise a timing
issue in the trial court, the State waived its right to argue that the
defendant's petition was untimely.67
A. Waiving the Timeliness Requirement: What Constitutes
"Lack of Culpable Negligence"?
A petitioner who does not file his or her petition within the limitation
period set forth in section 122-1(c) must show the "delay was not due to
his or her culpable negligence." 68  To show the absence of culpable
negligence, a petitioner must allege facts justifying the delay. 69 Lack of
61. People v. Woods, 739 N.E.2d 493 (I11. 2000).
62. Hager, 780 N.E.2d at 1097 (citing Woods, 739 N.E.2d at 496).
63. Id. at 1097. The court remanded the case, instructing the appellate court to "limit its
discussion to determining whether, aside from its timeliness, defendant's petition '[was] frivolous
or... patently without merit."' Id. (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (2000)). The
Illinois Supreme Court restricted the appellate court's consideration in light of the supreme
court's decision in People v. Boclair, decided that same day. Id. (discussing People v. Boclair,
202 II1. 2d 89 (2002)). Boclair held that the Act does not permit the summary dismissal of a post-
conviction petition during the first stage of post-conviction review on the ground that the petition
is untimely. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99; see also infra notes 74-106 and accompanying text
(discussing the first stage of review).
64. People v. Wright, 723 N.E.2d 230 (I11. 1999), overruled by Boclair, 202 Il. 2d at 99
(overruling the portion of Wright that a circuit court may summarily dismiss untimely petitions in
the initial phase of a post-conviction hearing).
65. Id. at 235.
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id.
68. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(c) (2000); see supra note 48 and accompanying text
(providing the statutory text of the timeliness requirement).
69. People v. Bates, 529 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Il1. 1988).
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culpable negligence is difficult to establish. 70 Further, a trial court's
determination of whether the delay was due to a defendant's culpable
negligence will only be reversed if the determination is manifestly
erroneous. 
7 1
In People v. Boclair, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a claim that
the phrase "culpable negligence" is unconstitutionally vague. 72  In
Boclair, the court looked at dictionary definitions and prior case law
and concluded that the "'culpably negligent' standard... contemplates
something greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to
recklessness. '" 7
3
B. May the Court Summarily Dismiss a Petition as
Untimely at the First Stage?
In recent years, an issue has arisen as to whether a trial court may
summarily dismiss a petition during the first stage of review merely
because the petition is untimely. In People v. Wright, after holding that
the State waived its right to contest the timeliness of a petition, the
Illinois Supreme Court went on to state: "In reaching this conclusion,
we caution that we are not limiting the trial court's ability, during the
court's initial review of noncapital petitions ... to dismiss the petition
70. People v. Bun-is, 734 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2000); People v. Perry, 687
N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997) ("Freedom from culpable negligence is very
difficult to establish.").
71. People v. Caballero, 688 N.E.2d 658, 662 (I11. 1997); People v. Van Hee. 712 N.E.2d 363.
366 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1999) (stating the manifestly erroneous standard). There is a split in
authority among the districts of the appellate court as to whether the defendant's lockdown status
in prison may be evidence that some delay may not be the result of the defendant's culpable
negligence. Van Hee, 712 N.E.2d at 366; People v. Mitchell, 696 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ill. App. Ct.
3d Dist. 1998) (holding that the court should determine whether the lockdown "deprived the
defendant of a meaningful opportunity to prepare his petition in a timely fashion"). But see
People v. McClain, 684 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1997) (holding that "a prison
'lockdown,' restricting an inmate's access to the prison law library, does not constitute a
legitimate excuse for the inmate's not filing a postconviction petition in a timely fashion" because
"the petitioner-inmate need only plead sufficient facts from which the trial court could find a
valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional fight"); see also People v. Tooley, 766 N.E.2d 305,
308 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2002) ("A defendant's allegation that he lacked access to a law library
is insufficient to prove lack of culpable negligence."); People v. Scullark, 759 N.E.2d 565, 578
(I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) ("[W]here segregation is at issue, the petitioner must allege that his
placement in segregation was through no fault of his own."); People v. Lee, 688 N.E.2d 673, 674
(Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1997) (holding that lack of access to a law library is not enough to prove
absence of culpable negligence).
72. People v. Boclair, 202 I11. 2d 89, 105-07 (2002) (discussing the difficulty in establishing a
lack of culpable negligence).
73. Id. at 105 (holding that the term "culpably negligent" is not unconstitutionally vague).
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as untimely." 74 This language resulted in a conflict among the districts
of the appellate court on the issue of whether trial courts could
summarily dismiss a petition as being untimely at the first stage of the
post-conviction proceeding. 75
The Illinois Supreme Court resolved this conflict in People v.
Boclair.76 In Boclair, the court held that the Act does not authorize the
dismissal of a post-conviction petition during the initial stage based on
timeliness. 77  In reaching its conclusion, the court looked at the
language of sections 122-2.1(a)(2) and 122.5 of the Act. The court
stated that a plain reading of section 122-2.1(a)(2) authorizes the
dismissal of a post-conviction petition only if the petition is deemed
frivolous or patently without merit, not if it is untimely filed. 78  The
legislature provided in section 122-5 that the State may file a motion to
dismiss if the petition is not timely filed.79 By addressing timeliness
and frivolousness in separate provisions of the Act, the legislature
plainly intended to draw a distinction between these two flaws of post-
conviction petitions. 80
The court then determined that the matter of timeliness should be left
for the State to assert during the second stage of post-conviction
proceedings. 81 The authors note that section 122-5 provides in part:
"The court may in its discretion make such order as to .. . extend[] the
time of filing any pleading other than the original petition, as shall be
appropriate, just and reasonable and is generally provided in civil
cases." 82 This language seems to lend support to the argument that a
74. People v. Wright, 723 N.E.2d 230, 237 (I11. 2000); see also Boclair, 202 I11. 2d at 105-07
(discussing the conflicting interpretations this language has generated).
75. For cases holding that a trial court could summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition as
being untimely at the first stage, see, for example, People v. Gunartt, 763 N.E.2d 862 (I11. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 2002), People v. Cruz, 755 N.E.2d 90 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001), People v.
Stewart, 762 N.E.2d 604 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001), People v. Lopez, 740 N.E.2d 1179 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000), People v. Harden, 737 N.E.2d 306 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000), and
People v. Boclair, 726 N.E.2d 1166 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000), rev'd, 202 I11. 2d 89 (2002).
But see People v. Johnson, 727 N.E.2d 1058 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2000), and People v. McCain,
727 N.E.2d 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2000), for cases holding that a trial court could not
summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition as being untimely at the first stage.
76. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 108.
77. Id. at 102. The court went on to state: "To the extent that our opinion in Wright may be
read as holding the contrary to be true, we now expressly overturn that portion of the Wright
decision." Id. at 99.
78. Id. at 102; see also supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the language of
section 122-2.1 (a)(2)).
79. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-5 (2000).
80. Boclair, 202 I11. 2d at 102.
81. Id.
82. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-5 (emphasis added).
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trial court does not have discretion to extend the time periods set out in
section 122-1. In a special concurrence in Boclair, Justice Freeman
suggested that the state legislature should clarify whether trial courts
should be able to summarily dismiss petitions based on timeliness. 83
On the same day the court issued its opinion in Boclair, it also issued
its opinion in People v. Hager.84 In Hager, the trial court summarily
dismissed a defendant's petition on the grounds that the petition was
patently "without merit." 85 The appellate court affirmed the summary
dismissal based on the fact that the petition was untimely. 86
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded
the case but ordered the appellate court to limit its decision on remand
to determining whether the defendant's petition was "frivolous or
patently without merit" under section 122-2.1(a)(2). 87 Based on the
decision in Boclair, the appellate court was precluded from considering
the issue of timeliness. 88 Based on the decision in Hager, it would
appear that the appellate court is also precluded from considering the
issue of timeliness on its own, absent a motion to dismiss by the State
and a ruling by the trial court.
In People v. Britt-El,89 also issued on the same day as Boclair, the
court held that the holding in Boclair was not to be retroactively applied
to a case on collateral review.90 The dissent pointed out, however, that
this issue was not addressed in the Boclair opinion itself.91
Consequently, Boclair should be applied retroactively. 92
It should be noted that Boclair's prohibition against dismissing
petitions due to timeliness applies only to first stage summary
dismissals. If the trial court dismisses the petition at the second stage,
Boclair will not apply.93
83. Boclair, 202 I11. 2d at 119 (Freeman, J., specially concurring).
84. People v. Hager, 780 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. 2002).
85. Id. at 1094.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1097.
88. Id.
89. People v. Britt-El, No. 89837, 2002 WL 1988167 (I11. Aug. 29, 2002).
90. Id. at *6.
91. Id. at *7 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
93. People v. Turner, No. 1-00-3452, 2003 WL 168446, at *3 (I11. App. Ct. Ist Dist. Jan. 24,
2003).
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IV. THE FIRST STAGE: SUMMARY DISMISSAL
A. Statutory Requirements
Within ninety days after the filing and docketing of a post-conviction
petition, the court shall examine the petition to determine if it is
frivolous or patently without merit.9 4 At the summary dismissal stage,
all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the original trial
record are to be taken as true. 95 If the court finds that "the petition is
frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a
written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it
made in reaching its decision." 96  An order of dismissal is a "final
judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail
within 10 days of its entry. ' 97 The standard of review for dismissals at
the first stage is de novo.98
In considering a petition during the first stage, "the court may
examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was
convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding
and any transcripts of such proceeding." 99 Section 122-1(a)(2) does not
contemplate any responsive pleadings by the State at this time.100 The
Act also does not contemplate the partial summary dismissal of some
claims at the first stage.'0 1 Where the circuit court determines that only
some of the claims of a non-capital defendant's petition are frivolous or
patently without merit, the court should proceed to the second stage and
94. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (2000).
95. People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (IIl. 1998) (capital case). People v. Coleman
was a capital case, but the Supreme Court specifically addressed section 122-2.1(a)(2). See id.
96. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(2).
97. Id.
98. People v. Barrow, 749 N.E.2d 892, 902 (I11. 2001) (capital case) (citing Coleman, 701
N.E.2d at 1075). Although People v. Barrow was a capital case, the de novo standard of review
for summary dismissals applies to both First and Second Stage dismissals.
99. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(c).
100. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1071. Although section 122-5 specifically contemplates that the
State may file a motion to dismiss or an answer only after the trial court has made its first stage
independent evaluation to determine frivolity, the mere premature filing of a motion or responsive
pleading in the first stage does not necessarily prevent the judge from conducting an independent
evaluation. See People v. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d 102, 107 (I11. 1996) (non-capital case); People v.
Ponyi, 734 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000).
101. People v. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d 306, 310-11 (11. 2001) (non-capital case) (stating that the
legislative history spoke of "ending with finality those petitions which in their totality are
frivolous and patently without merit" is not served by granting partial summary dismissals).
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counsel should be appointed to represent the defendant and review the
petition as a whole. 10
2
As discussed supra, the court need not appoint counsel for an
indigent, non-capital defendant at the summary dismissal stage. 10 3
Rather, counsel must only be appointed after the court initially reviews
the petition and only if it does not dismiss the petition on the ground of
frivolity. 10 4 If the petitioner is indigent and under sentence of death,
however, he may request appointment of counsel, and "the court shall
appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure
counsel. '' 10 5 If the petition is not dismissed, "the court shall order the
petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with
Sections 122-4 through 122-6." 106
B. The Ninety-Day Rule
The trial court must make its determination at the summary dismissal
stage within ninety days after the filing and docketing of the petition. 10 7
The court in People v. Vasquez10 8 stated that "[t]he 90-day provision of
section 122-2.1(a) is mandatory rather than discretionary, and a trial
court's failure to act within the 90-day period requires the court to
docket the petition for further proceedings under sections 122-4 through
122-6 of the Act." 109 The time period commences when the case is
docketed on the call of any trial court with jurisdiction over such a
102. People v. Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d 369, 376 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) (citing Rivera,
763 N.E.2d at 834). The court in People v. Montgomery
, 
also held that, pursuant to Rivera, if the
appellate court finds that any allegation of a multiple-claim, first-stage post-conviction petition is
not frivolous or patently without merit, the entire petition is remanded to the trial court for
appointment of counsel. Id. But see People v. Rogers, 756 N.E.2d 831, 834 (II1. 2001) (non-
capital case) (affirming the appellate court, which had affirmed the trial court's summary
dismissal of some of the defendant's claims, but remanding the case for further proceedings on
defendant's claims that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that
certain counts of his indictment were based on a single authority: rather than rely on Rivera and
remand the case to the trial court in its entirety, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal
of some of the counts).
103. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d at 309; see supra Part II.A (noting that a court can summarily dismiss
a non-capital defendant's post-conviction motion and that counsel must be appointed if the court
does not dismiss the motion); see also infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text (discussing
summary dismissal).
104. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d at 309.
105. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (2000).
106. Id. § 5/122-2.1(b).
107. Id. § 5/122-2.1(a) ("Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition the
court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to [Section 122-2. 1].").
108. People v. Vasquez, 718 N.E.2d 356 (II1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1999).
109. Id. at 358; see also People v. Smith. 726 N.E.2d 776. 779 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000)
("Illinois case law provides that the statutory time limit of 90 days is mandatory.").
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petition, even though the judge is not the original trial judge.' 10 The
filing of a notice of appeal does not toll or extend the ninety-day
deadline."1 ' When a defendant amends his original petition, however,
the ninety-day period is calculated from the filing of the amended
petition. 112
If the court's order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the State may
still file a motion to dismiss at the second stage upon remand.
l1 3
Similarly, there is no automatic right to an evidentiary hearing upon
remand from a reversal at the first stage. 114 Consequently, in reversing
the summary dismissal of a petition, courts of review should remand the
case to the second stage. 115
C. Requirements Under Sections 122-1 and 122-2
1. Statutory Requirements
Section 122-1 provides that a petition filed under the Act must be
verified, 116 and it "must specify in the petition or its heading that it is
110. People v. Green, 563 N.E.2d 61, 65 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) ("While it may be
practical for the post-conviction petition to be heard by the original trial court judge because he or
she is familiar with the case ... the statute's purpose, i.e., to insure that post-conviction petitions
are expeditiously reviewed, is served by holding that the 30 day period begins when the case is
docketed on the docket call of any trial court with jurisdiction.").
11. Vasquez. 718 N.E.2d at 358; People v. Dauer, 687 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Il. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1997).
112. People v. Watson, 719 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ill. 1999) (non-capital case for post-conviction
purposes).
113. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-5 ("Within 30 days after the making of an order pursuant to
subsection (b) of Section 122-2.1, or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall
answer or move to dismiss."); see also People v. Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d 369, 377 (I11. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 2001) (stating that if a case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with sections 122-4 through 122-6 of the Act, the State will then be given the
opportunity to answer or otherwise plead).
114. The defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of right. An evidentiary
hearing is warranted only if the defendant has made a substantial showing, based upon the record
and supporting affidavits, that his or her constitutional rights were violated. People v. Turner,
719 N.E.2d 725, 730 (I11. 1999) (capital case). Although People v. Turner was a capital case, the
standard for granting an evidentiary hearing is the same in all cases. See People v. Mahaffey, 742
N.E.2d 251 (111. 2000) (capital case) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is warranted only where
the allegations for the post-conviction petition make a substantial showing that a defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1029 (2001); People v. Orange,
749 N.E.2d 932 (Ill. 2001) (capital case) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is warranted on a
post-conviction petition if the allegations support a theory that a defendant's constitutional rights
have been violated).
115. See People v. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d 442, 453 (Il1. 2001) (non-capital case).
116. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(b) ("The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with
the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof)
verified by affidavit.").
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filed under this Section."' 17 A proceeding under the Act "may not be
commenced on behalf of a defendant who has been sentenced to death
without the written consent of the defendant, unless the defendant... is
incapable of asserting his or her own claim" because of a mental or
physical condition. 118
Section 122-2 specifies what must be contained in the petition.1 19
The petition must "clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner's
constitutional rights were violated." 120  "The petition shall have
attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations or shall state why the same are not attached." 121
Additionally, section 122-3 provides that "[a]ny claim of substantial
denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended
petition is waived." 122
2. What Constitutes a Frivolous or "Patently Without Merit" Petition?
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently discussed the standard to
apply in determining whether a petition is frivolous or patently without
merit. In People v. Edwards,123 the court reversed a trial court's
summary dismissal of a petition. 124 The court held that a petition "is
frivolous or patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition,
taken as true and liberally construed, fail to present the 'gist of a
constitutional claim."'' 125 The "gist" standard is "a low threshold," in
which the petitioner need only present a limited amount of detail and
need not set forth the claim in its entirety. 126 Legal arguments or
citations to legal authorities need not be included in the petition.' 127
The Edwards majority also rejected the reasoning in People v.
Lemons 128 and other appellate court cases, which held that a pro se
defendant must plead sufficient facts from which "the trial court could
find a valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional right" in order to
117. Id. §5/122-1(d).
118. Id. § 5/122-1(e).
119. Id. § 5/122-2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 5/122-3; see also infra Part VII (discussing waiver).
123. People v. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d 442 (Il. 2001) (non-capital case).
124. Id. at 443.
125. Id. at 445 (citing People v. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (11. 1996) (non-capital case)).
126. Id. (citing Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d at 107).
127. Id.
128. People v. Lemons, 613 N.E.2d 1234 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1993) (noting that a pro se
defendant alleged her trial attorney had coerced her into pleading guilty and accepting too long a
sentence).
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satisfy the "gist" standard. 129  The majority went on to say that "'the
sufficient facts' test used in Lemons and other appellate decisions is at
odds with this court's holdings and should be avoided."1 30  The
Edwards court then limited its holding to the specific issue before it,
that is, whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the defendant's
petition at the first stage of the proceedings.131
Justice Fitzgerald, in his concurrence in Edwards, had some practical
advice for trial courts when approaching first stage summary dismissals:
Where doubt exists regarding dismissal at the first stage, the trial court
should not hesitate to allow the claim to proceed to the second stage,
where counsel may amend the petition and craft a more proper
pleading for the court's review. If the petition is dismissed at the
second stage of the proceedings, a reviewing court is presented with
more adequately pleaded facts. Conversely, if the defendant is granted
an evidentiary hearing, the defendant will obtain that which by law is
his right. At present, this solution serves both the ends of justice and
judicial economy. 13 2
It should be noted that Edwards did not change the Supreme Court's
analysis of 122-2.1(a)(2) issues. It relied on its prior decisions in
People v. Gaultney133 and People v. Porter,1 34 both non-capital
cases. 135 It, however, did direct trial courts and the appellate court not
to follow the holding in Lemons and its progeny. 136  Thus, Edwards
should be cited whenever a court or a party analyzes the standard for
determining whether a post-conviction petition is frivolous or patently
without merit.
129. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d at 446.
130. Id. at 445-46.
131. Id. at 453. The court stated:
We do not hold that defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. To merit an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that he told his trial counsel to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to
do so, defendant will have to make a substantial showing to that effect. See Coleman,
183 Il1. 2d at 381. Such a showing will necessarily entail some explanation of the
grounds that could have been presented in the motion to withdraw the plea. Since
defendant will be at the second stage of the post-conviction proceedings and will be
represented by an attorney, rather than proceeding pro se, this will not present an
unreasonable burden.
Id.
132. Id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., specially concurring).
133. People v. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d 102 (Ill. 1996) (non-capital case).
134. People v. Porter, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (I1. 1998) (non-capital case).
135. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d at 445 (relying on the "gist" standard).
136. Id. at 445-46.
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3. Failure to Attach Affidavits, Records or Other Evidence and the
Sufficiency of Supporting Documentation 137
Under Section 122-2, the post-conviction petition must have attached
"affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall
state why the same are not attached."1 38 Failure to attach the necessary
affidavits, records, or other evidence, or explain their absence, is fatal to
a post-conviction petition 139 and by itself justifies the petition's
summary dismissal.14 0
In People v. Collins, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit
court's summary dismissal of a pro se defendant's post-conviction
petition because the defendant failed to comply with the affidavit
requirement set forth in section 122-2.141 The defendant had attached
only a "verification" affidavit to his petition. 142 The majority in Collins
held that this affidavit satisfied the requirement of section 122-1(b) that
post-conviction petitions must be verified by affidavit, but it was
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 122-2. 14 The
majority explained that the sworn verification confirmed that the
allegations in the petition were brought truthfully and in good faith. 144
The "affidavits, records, or other evidence" described in section 122-2,
"by contrast, show[] that the verified allegations are capable of
objective or independent corroboration."1 45
In a strongly worded dissent, written upon denial of petition for
rehearing, Justice McMorrow argued that the holding in Collins was in
conflict with the subsequent holding in Boclair.146 Justice McMorrow
also argued that the cases relied on by the majority were "manifestly
distinguishable."' 47 Justice McMorrow stated:
137. Although this Part is included under the heading of "First Stage Summary Dismissal,"
the reasoning applies equally to Second Stage Proceedings. The authors will also discuss the
applicability of this Part to Second Stage Proceedings. See infra Part V.B (discussing the
standard for reviewing dismissals that occur during the second stage of trial).
138. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2 (2000).
139. People v. Collins, 782 N.E.2d 195, 198 (Il. 2002) (non-capital case) (citing People v.
Turner, 719 N.E.2d 725, 730 (I11. 1999) (capital case)), reh'g denied, 782 N.E.2d 195, 203 (I11.
2002).
140. Id. (citing People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (I11. 1998) (capital case)).
141. Id. at 200. Furthermore, the defendant had alleged in his post-conviction petition that his
court-appointed attorney had failed to comply with his request to file an appeal of his plea of
guilty. Id. at 196.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 199.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 203 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 209 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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[People v.] Jennings[ 148... predates the addition of section 122-2(2)
to the Act. The petitioner in Jennings was represented by counsel and
summary dismissal was not a possibility. [People v.] Turner 14 91 and
[People v.] Coleman11501 are death penalty cases. There is no
summary dismissal for post-conviction petitions filed in capital cases.
See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 2000). It is plainly inappropriate
to rely on these decisions in this case, which is concerned solely with
the requirements a noncapital post-conviction petition must meet at
the summary dismissal stage.
15 ?
The dissent went on to cite the holding in People v. Williams152 as
support for reversing the summary dismissal. 153 The dissent stated that
because Williams predates section 122-2.1(2), it suffers from the same
deficiency as Jennings.154 Further, while Coleman was a capital case,
the Illinois Supreme Court specifically addressed section 122-2.1(2) in
that case. 155  Justice McMorrow's dissent certainly highlights the
problems faced by the courts and the parties when they cite cases in
support of their position.
The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently ruled that dismissal at
the second stage is justified when the defendant fails to attach
supporting documentation. 156  In People v. Johnson,157 the court
rejected a defendant's post-conviction claim that his attorney's failure to
call a witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 158 The
defendant's petition did not contain an affidavit from the witness that
trial counsel had failed to call, which rendered any further consideration
of the claim unnecessary. 159
Likewise, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of a petition at
the second stage in People v. Guest,160 where a defendant failed to
148. People v. Jennings, 102 N.E.2d 824 (Il1. 1952) (non-capital case).
149. People v. Turner, 719 N.E.2d 725, 725 (I11. 1999) (capital case).
150. People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (I11. 1998) (capital case).
151. Collins, 782 N.E.2d at 209 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
152. People v. Williams, 264 N.E.2d 697 (I11. 1970) (non-capital case).
153. Collins, 782 N.E.2d at 209 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
154. Id.; see also supra Part II.C (discussing the legislative history of the Act and its adoption
into law).
155. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1071.
156. As noted in Part I.C, supra, many of the cases reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court
are capital cases dismissed at the second stage. Although the legal underpinnings of these
decisions apply to first stage dismissals, the practitioner should carefully read the facts of each
case to determine if it is applicable to his or her particular situation.
157. People v. Johnson, 700 N.E.2d 996 (III. 1998) (capital case).
158. Id. at 1011-12.
159. Id. at 1004.
160. People v. Guest, 655 N.E.2d 873 (I11. 1995) (capital case).
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submit affidavits of his proposed witnesses. 161  Addressing the
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court said that
a defendant must introduce affidavits from those individuals who would
have testified in order to support a claim based on counsel's failure to
investigate and call witnesses. 162 The court said it could not determine
whether the witnesses could have provided any information or
testimony favorable to a defendant without affidavits. 163 The court held
that in Guest, "[b]ecause the defendant has failed to submit affidavits
from these proposed witnesses, we will not consider them further."
' 164
The Illinois Supreme Court has also consistently upheld the dismissal
of post-conviction petitions at the second stage when the record from
the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's allegations and
supporting documentation attached to the petition. 165 Whether a trial
court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition because the
record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's
allegation has been the subject of some disagreement. Since the court's
decision in People v. Boclair, several petitions for rehearing have been
filed, arguing that Boclair prohibits trial courts from considering
anything other than allegations in the petition at the summary dismissal
stage. This argument is based on the following language from Justice
Kilbride's opinion in Boclair:
The circuit court is required to make an independent assessment in the
summary review stage as to whether the allegations in the petition,
liberally construed and taken as true, set forth a constitutional claim
for relief. The court is further foreclosed from engaging in any fact
finding or any review of matters beyond the allegations of the petition.
People v. Coleman, 183 I11. 2d 366 (1998).166
This language is in apparent conflict with section 122-2.1 (c) of the Act,
which addresses summary dismissals, and provides: "In considering a
petition pursuant to this Section, the court may examine the court file of
the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken
by an appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such
proceedings." 167
161. Id. at 883.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing People v. Ashford, 520 N.E.2d 332, 340 (I11. 1998) (capital case)).
164. Id. (citing People v. Thompkins, 641 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ill. 1994) (capital case)).
165. See People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1072 (Ill. 1998) (capital case); see also People
v. Miller, No. 89408, 2002 WL 31839183, at *11 (111. Dec. 19, 2002) (capital case) (finding that
the record contradicted the capital defendant's allegations that his trial counsel failed to explain
that a natural life sentence was the most lenient sentence he could receive).
166. People v. Boclair, 202 I11. 2d 89, 99 (2002) (capital case).
167. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2.1(c) (2000).
660 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
In Boclair, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the holdings in
People v. Johnson and People v. McCain.168  The appellate court in
both Johnson and McCain commented that the trial court did not find
that the post-conviction petitions in question were frivolous or patently
without merit. 
169
Section 122-2.1(c) is not mentioned in the Boclair, Johnson, or
McCain decisions. Boclair and McCain, however, both cite to People v.
Coleman170 for the proposition that trial courts are "foreclosed from
engaging in any fact finding or any review of matters beyond the
allegations of the petition."'17 1  In fact, Coleman also held that "this
court has consistently upheld the dismissal of a post-conviction petition
when the allegations are contradicted by the record from the original
trial proceedings."' 172
Prior to the decision in Coleman, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld
the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition at the first stage in
People v. Ramirez.173 The court held that the trial court could rely
solely on the record before it, even though the defendant's allegations
related to an off-the-record discussion involving issues addressed by the
trial court when the defendant accepted his guilty plea. 7 4
Subsequent to its decision in Coleman, the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Rogers175 affirmed the summary dismissal of a post-
conviction petition that claimed that the defendant was not advised of
the possibility of consecutive sentencing. 176 The transcript of the plea
contradicted this claim. 177 The Illinois Supreme Court said, "We have
consistently upheld the dismissal of a post-conviction petition when the
record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's
allegations."1 7
8
168. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 104; People v. Johnson, 727 N.E.2d 1058 (Il1. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
2000); People v. McCain, 727 N.E.2d 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2000).
169. Johnson, 727 N.E.2d at 1060; McCain, 727 N.E.2d at 385.
170. People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (Ill. 1998) (capital case).
171. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99; McCain, 727 N.E.2d at 385.
172. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1072.
173. People v. Ramirez, 642 N.E.2d 1224, 1230 (I1. 1994) (non-capital case).
174. Id. at 1228. The defendant in Ramirez had also been given opportunities to air his claim
at the sentencing hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, and he failed to do so. Id. at 1227.
175. People v. Rogers, 756 N.E.2d 831 (111. 2001) (non-capital case).
176. Id. at 836.
177. Id. at 834.
178. Id. (citing People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1072 (I11. 1998) (capital case); People v.
Jones, 361 N.E.2d 1104 (I11. 1977) (non-capital case)).
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Section 122-2.1(c) was discussed and analyzed by the Illinois
Supreme Court quite recently in People v. Rivera.179 In Rivera, the
court held that the trial courts may not summarily dismiss only certain
claims in a post-conviction petition.180  If there are any valid claims
asserted in a petition, counsel must be appointed to review the entire
petition. 181 In discussing the basis for this holding, Justice Freeman
looked at the legislative history of section 122-2. 1:
Representative Johnson also spoke of how the amendment
contemplated a procedure 'where a quick look at the record in the case
will show that the petition is absolutely untrue. There is no need to go
to the expense of appointing a court appointed lawyer, of bringing the
individual back from the penitentiary. It only addresses that type of
petition.' (Emphasis added.) 83d I11. Gen. Assem. House Proceedings,
June 21, 1983, at 89 (statements of Representative Johnson). As these
comments reveal, the sponsors spoke of ending with finality those
petitions which in their totality are frivolous and patently without
merit. Partial summary dismissals, as allowed in this case by the
circuit court, do not further these legislative goals. 182
The appellate court has also recently addressed the direction found in
section 122-2.1(c) that a trial court may consider the court file, the
action of the appellate court, and the trial court proceedings when
deciding whether to summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition.183
"Those records should be examined to determine whether the
allegations are positively rebutted by the record. That determination
will assist the trial court in resolving the issue as to whether the petition
is frivolous or patently without merit." 184 These holdings are based on
the language in Coleman. "At the dismissal stage of a post-conviction
proceeding, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the
original trial record are to be taken as true."' 185
Based on all of the above, the authors believe section 122-2.1(c) is
still in effect, despite the contrary language in Boclair. Consequently,
trial courts and courts of review may still consider the court file, any
appellate court decision in the case, and the proceedings in the trial
court when determining whether to summarily dismiss a post-conviction
petition.
179. People v. Rivera, 763 N.E.2d 306, 308 (11. 2001) (non-capital case).
180. Id. at 310-11.
181. ld. at 310.
182. Id. at 311.
183. People v. Smith, 761 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001); People v.
Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d 369, 373-74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001).
184. Smith, 761 N.E.2d at 315; Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d at 374.
185. People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1073 (I11. 1998) (capital case) (emphasis added).
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V. THE SECOND STAGE: PROCEEDINGS ON THE PETITION
A. Statutory Requirements
If the petition is not dismissed during the first stage, pursuant to
section 122-2.1, and the defendant requests appointment of counsel, the
court shall appoint counsel during the second stage if satisfied that the
petitioner has no means of procuring counsel. 186 Section 122-5 requires
the State to either answer or move to dismiss the petition within thirty
days after the petition is docketed pursuant to section 122-2.1(b), or
within such further time as the court may set. 187 The State's failure to
seek dismissal, based on res judicata, of some issues in the defendant's
post-conviction petition does not automatically entitle the defendant to
an evidentiary hearing on those issues where, at the hearing on the
petition, the State requested dismissal of the petition in its entirety, thus
expanding on the relief originally requested. 188 In the event that the
State's motion to dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an
answer within twenty days after the court's denial. 189
The court may "make such order as to amendment of the petition or
any other pleading, or as to pleading over, or filing further pleadings, or
extending the time of filing any pleading other than the original petition,
as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally provided
in civil cases." 190 If the petitioner fails to raise a claim of substantial
denial of constitutional rights in the original or amended petition, the
claim is waived. 191
Where the State seeks dismissal of a petition instead of filing an
answer, its motion to dismiss assumes the truth of the allegations to
which it is directed and questions only their legal sufficiency. 192
Furthermore, an order granting the State's motion to dismiss is a final
judgment subject to de novo review. 193
186. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-4 (2000).
187. Id. § 5/122-5.
188. People v. Thompkins, 641 N.E.2d 371, 376 (11. 1994) (capital case).
189. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-5.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 5/122-3; see also infra Part VII (discussing waiver).
192. People v. Ward, 718 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Ill. 1999) (capital case).
193. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-7; see also People v. Barrow, 749 N.E.2d 892, 902 (Ill.
2001) (capital case) ("A circuit court's dismissal of a post-conviction petition without a hearing
will be reviewed de novo.").
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B. What Is the Standard for Granting an Evidentiary Hearing?
A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of ight. The
mere allegation of a constitutional violation is insufficient to justify an
evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition, and a petitioner is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he or she has made a
substantial showing, based on the record and supporting affidavits, that
his or her constitutional fights were violated. 194 In determining whether
to grant an evidentiary hearing, "all well-pled facts in the defendant's
petition and any accompanying affidavits are taken as true." 195
Nonfactual and nonspecific assertions that merely amount to
conclusions, however, are insufficient to require a hearing under the
Act. 196
1. Cases Affirming Dismissal Without an Evidentiary Hearing
The Illinois Supreme Court has applied these standards in a number
of recent decisions where it affirmed the trial courts' dismissal at the
second stage. In People v. Burt, the court affirmed the dismissal of a
petition without an evidentiary hearing. 197 In Burt, the defendant was
charged with murder and armed robbery of two individuals. 198 During
the course of the jury trial, the defendant pled guilty just prior to the
State resting its case. 199  The case proceeded to sentencing and the
defendant was sentenced to death.200
In his amended post-conviction proceeding, the defendant claimed
there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial and that his
attorney was incompetent for not requesting a fitness hearing during
trial.20 1 In support of this claim, he contended that his decision to
change his plea to guilty midway through trial was irrational and
illustrated that his "will had become flattened" and "his desire for self-
preservation disappeared.- 202
194. People v. Orange, 749 N.E.2d 932, 939 (I11. 2001) (capital case); People v. Mahaffey,
742 N.E.2d 251, 261 (1I. 2000) (capital case); People v. Turner, 719 N.E.2d 725, 730 (Ill. 1999)
(capital case). All of these are capital cases, but the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing
is the same in all cases.
195. People v. Burt, No. 86898, 2001 WL 1243631, at *3 (I11. Oct. 18, 2001) (capital case)
(citing People v. Towns, 696 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ill. 1998) (capital case)).
196. Id. (citing People v. Coleman, 660 N.E.2d 919, 933 (I1. 1995) (capital case)).
197. Id. at *10.
198. Id. at *2.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *3.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *5.
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In affirming the dismissal of a petition without an evidentiary
hearing, the court relied upon the transcript of the defendant's plea in
finding that the assertion in his petition, that his will was "flattened,"
was untrue.
20 3
Similarly, in People v. Edwards, the court affirmed the dismissal of
the defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing, where the
capital defendant alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach several witnesses with certain information. 20 4 The court found
that the amended petition, which presented those issues in summary
fashion and then cited a lengthy summary of the police investigation,
did not make a substantial showing of a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights. 20 5
In People v. Simpson,20 6 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of a capital defendant's petition at the second stage.20 7 In
Simpson, the court addressed the scope of the new Illinois Supreme
Court Rules governing death penalty cases. The majority held that the
new Illinois Supreme Court rules would not be applied retroactively and
they were not intended to overrule well-established constitutional
guaranties regarding the right to self-representation. 20 8
2. Cases Reversing the Trial Court's Order Dismissing the Petition
Without an Evidentiary Hearing 20 9
In People v. Harris,2 10 the defendant alleged that his trial counsel
was ineffective during the capital sentencing hearing because he failed
to investigate and present evidence in mitigation. 211 In support of his
claim, the defendant relied upon his trial attorney's affidavit wherein the
attorney admitted that he negligently failed to investigate or present
evidence in mitigation, even though trial counsel submitted seventeen
letters from the defendant's family and friends during the sentencing
203. Id. at *6.
204. People v. Edwards, 745 N.E.2d 1212, 1227 (I11.) (capital case), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1023 (2001).
205. Id.
206. People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084 & 86926, 2001 WL 1136728 (11. Sept. 27, 2001) (capital
case).
207. Id. at *20.
208. Id. at *16-17; see also People v. Jackson, No. 88474, 2001 WL 1632291 (I11. Dec. 20,
2001) (capital case) (applying the old supreme court rules governing capital cases even though
the new rules had been adopted).
209. See infra Part VII (discussing additional case law relating to the legality of a trial court's
dismissal of a petition without an evidentiary hearing).
210. People v. Harris, No. 89796, 2002 WL 1340896 (I11. June 20, 2002) (capital case).
211. Id.at*l.
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hearing. 212  The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
summary dismissal of the petition and remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing on this issue.213 The court applied the standard for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v.
Washington214 and concluded, "We cannot say that the mitigation
evidence contained in the post-conviction record could not have altered
the determination that there was no evidence that mitigated against the
imposition of the death sentence." 2 15
Similarly, in People v. Orange,2 16 the defendant's post-conviction
petition claimed that his attorney was ineffective at sentencing. 217
Orange's attorney did not present any mitigation witnesses at the
sentencing hearing because he felt there was "a lack of a significant
criminal history on the part of this defendant." 218  In support of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant attached affidavits
of eighteen relatives, friends, and employers "who, if contacted, would
have testified to positive traits and actions of the defendant despite an
abusive and violent upbringing." 219  The defendant also submitted a
deposition of defense counsel, wherein the defense counsel admitted
that he did not investigate and present mitigating witnesses because he
felt it would be fruitless.220
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary
dismissal of the defendant's post-conviction petition and remanded the
cause for an evidentiary hearing.221 The court stated that at the hearing
that the trial court must determine "whether defense counsel acted in
conformity with defendant's wishes or if his client's reluctance was a
212. Id. at *12. In his affidavit, counsel admitted that he "never seriously considered that [the
defendant's] case was a death penalty case in the sense that it never occurred to [him] that a death
sentence might actually be imposed." Id. at *13. The affidavit went on to say, "I never
investigated [the defendant's] case to develop evidence for purposes of a capital sentencing
hearing .... [M]y failure to investigate was based entirely upon my own feeling that [the
defendant's] case didn't merit imposition of the death penalty ..... Id.
213. Id.at*17.
214. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also infra Part VIII.A.l (discussing
in more detail the Strickland standard and its application to trial sentencing errors).
215. Harris, 2002 WL 1340896, at * 15.
216. People v. Orange, 659 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995) (capital case).
217. Id. at 939.
218. Id. at 948.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 949. Defense counsel also admitted he did not attempt to contact any mitigation
witnesses, claiming that he acted in conformity with the defendant's wishes because "it was his
'impression' that the defendant 'was not about to humble himself."' Id.
221. Id. at 951.
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result of counsel discouraging his client from presenting any mitigating
witnesses." 222
VI. STAGE THREE: THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
A. Statutory Requirements
At the evidentiary hearing, "the court may receive proof by affidavits,
depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence." 223 If the court rules in
the defendant's favor, "it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to
the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings, and such
supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, or
discharge as may be necessary and proper." 224 As previously noted, the
decision to have the defendant present at the hearing is within the sound
discretion of the hearing judge, and only a clear abuse of discretion or
application of impermissible legal standards will justify reversal. 225 In
addition, even though section 122-8 of the Act provides that the petition
be reviewed by a judge other than the one who presided at the original
trial, this provision was found to be unconstitutional in People v.
Joseph.226
An order granting or denying relief after an evidentiary hearing is a
final judgment on the petition and is subject to review "in a manner
pursuant to the rules of the Supreme Court."227 The standard of review
of a ruling by a court in a post-conviction proceeding in which an
evidentiary hearing was held is the manifestly erroneous standard.228
In People v. Johnson, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of some of the capital defendant's post-conviction claims and
the denial of other claims.229 The court first looked at section 122-6
and held that "this proceeding was a section 122-6 hearing even though
222. Id. at 950.
223. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-6 (2000).
224. Id.
225. Id.; People v. Collins, 619 N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1993) (affirming the
trial court's order requiring the Illinois Department of Corrections to transport the inmate to the
county for the hearing and vacating the portion of the trial court's order remanding the defendant
inmate to the county sheriff because courts were without authority to transfer inmates from one
facility to another).
226. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-8; People v. Joseph, 495 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Ill. 1986) (non-
capital case).
227. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-7.
228. People v. Scott, 742 N.E.2d 287, 293 (Il. 2001) (capital case), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 873
(2001).
229. People v. Johnson, No. 89910, 2002 WL 31839199, at *1 (111. Dec. 19, 2002) (capital
case).
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no live testimony was presented., 230 The court then held that, while it
would review de novo the claims dismissed by the trial court, the court
would review the defendant's claims as to his fitness to plead guilty and
the performance of trial counsel under a manifestly erroneous standard,
as these claims were denied following the section 122-6 hearing.
231
The State's substantive right to appeal from the granting of a
defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is unaffected by Supreme
Court Rule 604(a), which does not allow the state to appeal
interlocutory rulings in criminal cases that do not effectively result in
dismissal of charges. 232 Even though criminal procedural rules apply to
appeals from post-conviction proceedings, the grant of a post-conviction
petition is a final judgment on a civil matter that the State may
appeal.233  If the trial court dismisses the petition or denies post
conviction relief at any stage, the defendant may appeal.234
B. Discovery
In a post-conviction proceeding, the trial court has inherent authority
to order discovery based on, "among other relevant circumstances, the
issues presented in the post-conviction petition, the scope of discovery
sought, [and] the length of time between the conviction and the post-
conviction proceeding." 235 The taking of discovery depositions for a
post-conviction proceeding is neither authorized nor prohibited by the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act.236 Instead, it is a matter within the trial
judge's inherent authority.237 In deciding whether to authorize the
taking of depositions, the trial court should consider the burden that the
deposition would impose on the opposing party and the witness.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently issued a cautionary note to trial
courts when ruling on discovery issues. In People v. Johnson, the court
230. Id. at *4; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-6 (mandating that a trial court may
"receive testimony by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence" and has the
discretion to determine whether to bring a petitioner before the court for a hearing).
231. Johnson, 2002 WL 31839199, at *5 ("We will give some deference to the circuit court in
acknowledgment of its familiarity with petitioner's case and particularly with the professional
performance of trial counsel.").
232. People v. Andretich, 614 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1993); see also ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 604(a)(1) ("[T]he State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect
of which results in dismissing a charge ... ; arresting judgment...; quashing an arrest...; or
suppressing evidence.").
233. Andretich, 614 N.E.2d at 491.
234. People v. Rovito, 762 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001).
235. People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875, 892-93 (Ill. 1997) (capital case).
236. People v. Henderson, 662 N.E.2d 1287, 1303 (III. 1996) (capital case).
237. Id.
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said the trial court must exercise its authority to order discovery with
caution, as "a defendant may attempt to divert attention away from
constitutional issues which escaped earlier review by requesting
discovery." 238 In addition, "the trial court should allow discovery only
if the defendant has shown 'good cause,' and should consider the issues
presented in the petition, the scope of the requested discovery, the
length of time between the conviction and the post-conviction
proceeding, the burden of discovery on the State and on any witnesses,
and the availability of evidence through other sources." 239 The court
indicated it would reverse a trial court's denial of discovery at the post-
conviction stage only for an abuse of discretion. 240
VII. RES JUDICATA, WAIVER, AND SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS
A. Res Judicata and Waiver
As mentioned earlier, "[a]ny claim of substantial denial of
constitutional rights not raised in an original or amended petition is
waived. '24 1 Furthermore, a "defendant waives a post-conviction issue
if the issue is not raised in the original or amended post-conviction
petition." 242
In the context of post-conviction proceedings, "[w]aiver is a rule of
administrative convenience, not a jurisdictional or absolute bar to
procedurally defaulted claims." 243 Strict application of the waiver rule
to bar the presentation of issues in a post-conviction proceeding "may
be relaxed in certain instances, including when the factual insufficiency
238. People v. Johnson, No. 85134, 2002 WL 592153, at *14 (I11. Apr. 18, 2002) (capital
case) (citing People v. Hickey, No. 87286, 2001 WL 1137273, at *5 (I11. Sept. 27, 2001) (capital
case)) (modified on denial of rehearing May 29, 2002); see also People v. Enis, 743 N.E.2d 1,
30-31 (I11. 2000) (capital case) (concluding that a defendant's post-conviction subpoena of his
police file, which the police withheld during trial, in an effort to discover exculpatory evidence
"was little more than a fishing expedition" because the defendant did not argue during trial that
either a discovery violation or a Brady violation had occurred).
239. Johnson, 2002 WL 592153, at *14 (citing People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 526 N.E.2d
131, 135 (Il. 1988) (non-capital case)); see also People v. Fair, 738 N.E.2d 500, 504 (I11. 2000)
(capital case) ("[T]he circuit court should allow discovery only after the moving party
demonstrates 'good cause' for a discovery request.").
240. Johnson, 2002 WL 592153, at *14. The court further noted: "A trial court does not
abuse its discretion in denying a discovery request which ranges beyond the limited scope of a
post-conviction proceeding and amounts to a 'fishing expedition."' Id. (citing Enis, 743 N.E.2d
at 30-31); see also People v. Lucas, No. 89458, 2002 WL 31839191, at *13 (I11. Dec. 19, 2002)
(capital case) (upholding the trial court's order refusing to grant further discovery to the defense).
241. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-3 (2000); see also text accompanying note 122 (quoting 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-3).
242. People v. Barrow, 749 N.E.2d 892, 912 (I11. 2001) (capital case).
243. People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (111. 1998) (capital case).
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of the record on appeal prevented an appellant from raising an issue
before the reviewing court." 244 This exception is triggered "when the
evidentiary basis for the claim lies outside the record, and not by the
mere failure of the party to present or raise a claim." 245 "The doctrines
of res judicata and waiver ... will be relaxed in post-conviction
proceedings in three situations: where fundamental fairness so requires;
where the alleged waiver stems from the incompetence of appellate
counsel; or where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the
face of the original appellate record. 2 4 6
Even though there are situations where the doctrines of res judicata
and waiver will be relaxed, these doctrines are still viable and strictly
applied today. In People v. Scott,24 7 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that in a proceeding under the Act the doctrine of waiver barred
consideration of claims of instructional errors that could have been, but
were not, raised on direct appeal. 248 Similarly, in People v. McNeal,249
a claim by a capital murder defendant that a decision by the Illinois
Supreme Court in a separate case, suppressing his co-defendant's
confession, required suppression of the evidence in his own case, could
not be raised for the first time on appeal from a denial of the
defendant's post-conviction petition. 250
An important issue that remains unresolved is whether appellate
counsel may raise issues on appeal that the pro se petitioner did not
raise before the trial court. Courts of review are often confronted with
this issue because appellate counsel is routinely appointed to represent
pro se petitioners after the summary dismissal of their petitions. In
People v. Bates,251 the First District rejected the State's argument that a
defendant could not raise for the first time on appeal that he was
improperly admonished pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(b)
before he pled guilty. 252 The authors, however, believe that Bates is
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. People v. Mahaffey, 742 N.E.2d 251, 261 (II1. 2000) (capital case).
247. People v. Scott, 742 N.E.2d 287, 292 (Ill. 2000) (capital case), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 873
(2001).
248. Id. at 292.
249. People v. McNeal, 742 N.E.2d 269 (II1. 2001) (capital case).
250. Id. at 275.
251. People v. Bates, 751 N.E.2d 180 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) (non-capital case).
252. Id. at 183-84; see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 605(b) (enumerating the steps a defendant who
has entered a non-negotiated plea of guilty must take to exercise the right to appeal).
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applicable only in cases where the record indicates that a defendant was
not properly admonished pursuant to Rule 605(b).253
By considering issues raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate
court undermines the authority of the trial court to review the petition
and, if the petition fails to allege a substantial denial of the defendant's
constitutional rights, to summarily dismiss the petition under section
122-2.1(a)(2). The appellate court would be treating these issues as if
the trial court had summarily dismissed them, even though they were
never presented to the trial judge.
In his special concurrence in Boclair, Justice Freeman suggested that
the legislature amend the Act to "allow a trial judge to dismiss a
petition, without prejudice, for lack of timeliness. In that way, a
petitioner would be able to amend the petition to include the necessary
allegations concerning the lack of culpable negligence." 254 In Justice
McMorrow's special concurrence in Boclair, she opined that the
majority in Collins should have allowed the defendant
the opportunity to amend his post-conviction petition with an
explanation for why an additional affidavit was unavailable. [Illinois]
case law would permit such an amendment. See People v. Watson,
187 Ill. 2d 448 (1999). Nevertheless, th[e] court held that the
defendant's petition should be finally dismissed.
255
In his special concurrence in Boclair, Justice Thomas responded to
Justice McMorrow:
[A] petition that does not meet these requirements-as to either the
necessary allegations or the necessary affidavits-is not sufficient to
invoke the Act ....
In Collins, the court correctly held that, in determining whether a
post-conviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit, the trial
court may consider whether the proffered petition is in fact a 'petition'
as defined by the Act.256
The authors believe that if a petition that does not allege a substantial
violation of constitutional rights is not sufficient to invoke the Act, and
the petitioner's appellate counsel concedes as much by not reasserting
253. See People v. Jamison, 690 N.E.2d 995, 997-98 (Il1. 1998) (capital case) (requiring
remand due to the judge's failure to comply with Rule 605(b)). Contra People v. Burton, 703
N.E.2d 49, 57-58 (Il. 1998) (capital case). In People v. Burton, the court held the circuit court's
failure to give the warnings required under Rule 605(b) was harmless because the circuit court
had the opportunity to consider the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentence.
Id.
254. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 117 (2002) (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (non-
capital case).
255. Id. at 125 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring).
256. Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
670 [Vol. 34
2003] Proceedings Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act 671
on appeal any of the grounds raised in the petition, the appellate court
should not find that the trial court erroneously dismissed the petition.
Rather, the court should affirm the dismissal. This position is supported
by the recent decision in People v. Britt-El. In Britt-El, the defendant
filed a second post-conviction petition, which presented many claims
that were not raised in the defendant's first post-conviction petition.257
The court noted that, "[i]n his brief before th[e] court, defendant [did]
not mention the additional claims raised in his second post-conviction
petition nor [did] he argue that these claims were excused from the
waiver provision of section 122-3. ",258 The court said it could find no
reason "why the additional claims could not have been included
in the defendant's first petition."259 Consequently, the claims in the
defendant's second petition, which were not included in his first
petition, were waived. 260
The authors believe that it is significant that Britt-El's first post-
conviction petition was filed pro se. The Illinois Supreme Court limited
its review to consideration of those claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, which were raised in both the defendant's first and second
post-conviction petitions, even though the first post-conviction petition
was filed pro se.26 1 This strict application of the waiver language in
section 122-3 makes clear that any claim not raised in the original or
amended petition is waived, whether the new claim is raised for the first
time in a successive petition or on appeal, even if the original petition
was filed pro se.
B. Successive Petitions
Where a claimed error could not have been presented in an earlier
proceeding, there is a potential that a second or subsequent post-
conviction petition may be filed.262  The Illinois Supreme Court
comprehensively addressed successive post-conviction petitions in
People v. Pitsonbarger.263 In Pitsonbarger, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that section 122-3 of the Act expressly requires courts to apply the
257. People v. Britt-El, No. 89837, 2002 WL 1988167, at *1 (111. Aug. 29, 2002) (non-capital
case).
258. Id. at *4.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, 2002 WL 1038729, at *12-13 (I11. May 23,
2002) (capital case)).
262. People v. Flores, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (I11. 1992) (capital case), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
831 (1993).
263. People v. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, 2002 WL 1038729 (Ill. May 23, 2002) (capital case).
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procedural bar of waiver when reviewing claims asserted in a
successive post-conviction petition. 264 This statutory bar may only be
relaxed when fundamental fairness requires it.265  In determining
whether fundamental fairness requires that a claim raised in a
successive petition be considered on its merits, the courts must apply
the "cause-and-prejudice test." 266 The court explained: "we reiterate
that 'cause' in this context refers to any objective factor, external to the
defense, which impeded the petitioner's ability to raise a specific claim
in the initial post-conviction proceeding," 267 and the "[p]rejudice, in this
context, would occur if the petitioner were denied consideration of an
error that so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or
sentence violated due process." 268 As with the constitutional test for
ineffective assistance of counsel, 269 both elements of the cause-and-
prejudice test must be met in order for the petitioner to prevail.27 °
The court pointed out that section 122-3 of the Act provides that
"'any claim' not raised in the original or an amended petition is
waived. 271  Consequently, the court held that "a petitioner must
establish cause and prejudice as to each individual claim asserted in a
successive petition." 272 This requirement means that a petitioner must
show how the deficiency in the first post-conviction proceeding affected
his ability to raise each specific claim. The court also held that even if a
petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, "his failure to raise a claim
in an earlier petition will be excused if necessary to prevent a
fundamental miscarriage of justice." 273 To invoke this exception to the
waiver rule of section 122-3, though, "[a] petitioner must show actual
innocence, or, in the context of the death penalty, he must show that but
for the claimed constitutional error he would not have been found
eligible for the death penalty." 274
264. Id. at *1, *11.
265. Id. at *10 (citing Flores, 606 N.E.2d at 1085).
266. Id. at *6.
267. Id. at *8.
268. Id. at *10 (citing Flores, 606 N.E.2d at 1090).
269. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also infra Part VIII.A
(discussing ineffective assistance of counsel).
270. Pitsonbarger, 2002 WL 1038729, at *14.
271. Id. at*9.
272. Id.
273. Id. at *7.
274. Id.; see People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (Il. 2001) (capital case) (citing
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348 (1992)).
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VIII. RECURRING ISSUES IN POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
The Act and the case law limit, to some degree, the number of issues
a petitioner can raise in a post-conviction petition. The Act limits the
petitioner to claims involving a "substantial denial" of the petitioner's
rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or
both. 275 Also, as mentioned above, "[a]ll issues decided on direct
appeal are res judicata, and all issues that could have been raised in the
original proceeding but were not are waived. 276  Despite these
limitations, a number of recurring issues are raised in post-conviction
proceedings. This Part will analyze recurring and unresolved issues that
have recently been addressed by the Supreme Court.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
The most common issue raised in post-conviction petitions is the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This Sixth Amendment claim
pervades almost every petition filed in the trial courts and almost every
opinion issued by our courts of review. "Ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims in post-conviction petitions are judged [by] ... the
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington."277 This standard is the same standard used to analyze
ineffective assistance of counsel claims made on direct review.
In People v. Coleman, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed
Strickland in the context of post-conviction proceedings. 278 To prevail
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant first must
establish that his attorney's performance was deficient in that "counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 279 "A defendant
must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or
inaction was the product of sound trial strategy and not of
incompetence." 280 For example, "[w]hether defense counsel's failure to
investigate amounts to ineffective assistance is determined by the value
275. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2 (2000).
276. People v. Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) (citing People
v. Whitehead, 662 N.E.2d 1304, 1311 (Ill. 1996) (capital case)); see also supra text
accompanying note 9 (quoting Montgomery).
277. People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1079 (I1. 1998) (capital case) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
278. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1079.
279. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
280. Id. (citing People v. Barrow, 549 N.E.2d 240, 240 (Il. 1989) (capital case)).
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of the evidence that was not presented at trial and the closeness of the
evidence that was presented. ' 281
Addressing the second prong in Strickland, the Coleman court stated
that "a defendant must demonstrate that, but for defense counsel's
deficient performance, the result of the proceedings would have been
different." 282 Although both prongs of the Strickland test must be met
before a defendant can succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court in Coleman went on to note that "[c]ourts, however,
may resolve ineffectiveness claims under the two-part Strickland test by
reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice renders
irrelevant the issue of counsel's performance." 283
The cases addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel are fact specific. When analyzing the case law in this area, the
practitioner should keep in mind the strength or weakness of the State's
case as well as the stage at which the post-conviction petition was
disposed of in the trial court.284 The practitioner should also look at the
sufficiency of the documentation supporting the allegations when
reviewing these decisions. 285
281. Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d at 374; People v. Smith, 761 N.E.2d 306, 328 (I11. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 2001).
282. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d at 1079 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The court reviewed
trial counsel's performance in Coleman and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of whether counsel's failure to interview a witness was sufficiently deficient under
Strickland. Id. at 1079-80. The court went on to reject a second claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel where the petition alleged counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of a related
shooting. Id. at 1080. The court held defendant could not establish the requisite prejudice under
Strickland, so there was no need to determine whether defendant satisfied the deficiency prong of
Strickland. Id.
283. Id. at 1079 (citations omitted).
284. See, e.g., Montgomery, 763 N.E.2d at 375. In People v. Montgomery, the court reversed
the summary dismissal at the first stage based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to investigate and present expert evidence that the victim died not from strangulation
but from a seizure. Id. The court based its decision on the "value of the evidence and the
closeness of the case." Id. But see People v. Smith, 745 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 2000) (capital case).
In People v. Smith, the court held that the petitioner made an insufficient showing to warrant an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that, but for his trial counsel's failure to present evidence of
other mitigating factors, defendant would not have been sentenced to death. Id. at 1211. The
court reasoned that counsel presented a complete picture of defendant's upbringing and a detailed
picture of the defendant's good behavior and adjustment to incarceration. Id. The additional
proffered evidence, even if true, would have had minimal impact on sentencing. Id.; see also
People v. Peeples, No. 83783, 2002 WL 1340876, at *38 (I11. June 20, 2002) (capital case)
(upholding the trial court's dismissal of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel's claims at
the second stage).
285. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 745 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. 2001) (capital case), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1023 (2001). In People v. Edwards, the court held that an evidentiary hearing was not
warranted on allegations that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach several witnesses
with certain information. Id. at 1227. The court reasoned that the amended petition presented
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2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
The Strickland two-prong test also applies to claims of ineffective
appellate counsel. 286 A defendant must allege facts showing the failure
to raise an issue was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's
decision prejudiced the defendant. 287 If the underlying issue is without
merit, however, a defendant has suffered no prejudice. 288
In People v. Johnson, the court held that appellate counsel's choices
regarding which issues to pursue are normally entitled to substantial
deference. 289 The court reasoned that appellate counsel need not brief
every conceivable issue and may refrain from developing issues without
merit because the defendant suffers no prejudice under Strickland.29 °
The court, however, went on to say that "the prejudice inquiry requires
[the court] to examine the merits of the claims not raised by appellate
counsel. 29 1
In People v. Simpson, the Supreme Court considered allegations in a
post-conviction petition that a police officer committed perjury before
the grand jury, at both a motion to suppress and at trial.292 The court
first agreed with the State that, as all of the testimony in question was
contained in the record on direct appeal, "each of these claims could
have and should have been raised on direct appeal. Thus, these claims
are waived. 293  The court continued by saying that "fundamental
fairness" may require that the principles of waiver be relaxed.294 The
court explained that in order to invoke the fundamental fairness
exception, the defendant must satisfy a "cause and prejudice" test by
objectively showing that his defense counsel's efforts to raise the claim
those issues in summary fashion and then cited a lengthy summary of the police investigation. Id.
Therefore, the petition did not make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Id.
286. People v. Rogers, 756 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Il1. 2001) (non-capital case).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. People v. Johnson, No. 85134, 2002 WL 592153, at *13 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2002) (capital
case) (citing People v. Mack, 658 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Il1. 1995) (capital case)).
290. Id. (citing People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1107 (11. 2000) (capital case); People v.
Easley, 736 N.E.2d 975 (Ill. 2000) (capital case)).
291. Id.
292. People v. Simpson, No. 85084, 2001 WL 1136728, at *6 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2001) (capital
case).
293. Simpson, 2001 WL 1136728, at *6; see also People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664, 669-70
(Ill. 1999) (capital case) (holding that any issues that could have been raised on direct appeal are
procedurally defaulted if not raised).
294. Simpson, 2001 WL 1136728, at *6.
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on direct review were impeded and that the error so infected the entire
trial that the defendant's conviction violated due process. 295
The "cause and prejudice" test to review claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel raised in an initial post-conviction
petition is also the test used to review whether a claim not raised in an
initial petition can be raised in a successive petition.296  The authors
believe that the "cause and prejudice" test should be applied whenever a
court must determine whether to invoke the fundamental fairness
exception to a waived claim.
The Illinois Supreme Court has also held that a public defender may
be appointed as post-conviction counsel even if the pro se petition
asserts that the public defender at trial or on appeal was incompetent. 297
In People v. Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a capital
defendant's claims that he received ineffective assistance where only
one lawyer represented him and that he was prejudiced by the lack of a
mitigation expert's report. 298 The court rejected the defendant's claim
that "a public defender who is appointed by a majority of circuit judges
operates under an inherent conflict of interest." 299 The court continued,
"Petitioner has not cited a single case from Illinois or elsewhere in
which a public defender or other court-appointed attorney was deemed
to be operating under an inherent conflict of interest merely because his
paycheck comes from county coffers." 3°°
3. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel
A defendant is not constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of
counsel at a post-conviction proceeding but is, however, entitled to a
reasonable level of assistance pursuant to the Act.30 1 Allegations by a
petitioner of post-conviction counsel's failure to provide reasonable
295. Id. (citing People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750, 758 (Il1. 1995) (capital case)); People v.
Mahaffey, 742 N.E.2d 251, 262 (Il1. 2000) (capital case).
296. See People v. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, 2002 WL 1038729, at *6-7 (Ill. May 23, 2002)
(capital case): see also supra Part VII.B (discussing successive petitions).
297. People v. Banks, 520 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Il. 1987) (non-capital case). The court in People
v. Banks held that there was no per se conflict of interest for one member of the public defenders
office to assert the ineffective assistance of counsel of another member. Id. The issue of whether
an allegiance to the public defenders office resulted in a conflict of interest had to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Id.; see also People v. Tenner, 677 N.E.2d 859, 869 (Il1. 1997) (capital case)
(holding that, absent evidence of an actual conflict, there is no conflict of interest because
appellate counsel and trial counsel both worked for the Cook County Public Defender's office).
298. People v. Johnson, No. 89910, 2002 WL 31839199, at *15 (Il1. Dec. 19, 2002) (capital
case).
299. Id. at * 15.
300. ld. at 6 15-16.
301. People v. Guest, 655 N.E.2d 873, 887 (111. 1995) (capital case).
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assistance at a prior post-conviction proceeding do not present a
constitutional basis upon which relief can be granted under the Act.
30 2
In People v. Johnson, post-conviction counsel filed an affidavit as a
supplemental record in the appeal. 303  In the affidavit, it was
unequivocally established that counsel made no effort to investigate the
claims raised in the defendant's post-conviction petition or to obtain
affidavits from any of the witnesses specifically identified in
defendant's pro se petition. 30 4  The Illinois Supreme Court held that
post-conviction counsel failed to provide a reasonable level of
assistance by not attempting to contact and obtain affidavits of
identified witnesses in support of the post-conviction petition.30 5 The
court reversed the trial court's determination that the petition did not
warrant an evidentiary hearing due to the absence of supporting
affidavits. 306
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 governs appeals in post-conviction
proceedings and imposes additional requirements for post-conviction
attorneys. 30 7 The court in People v. Turner interpreted Rule 651.308 In
Turner, the court held that there is no requirement that post-conviction
counsel amend a petitioner's pro se petition, but Rule 651(c) does
require appointed counsel to make any amendments necessary for an
adequate presentation of the petitioner's claims. 30 9 Cases, however,
have also held that Rule 651(c) applies only to "pro se petitions which
may need modification by appointed counsel and that there is no
302. People v. Jones, 747 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001).
303. People v. Johnson, 609 N.E.2d 304, 311 (111. 1993) (capital case).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 314.
306. Id. at 313.
307. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 65 1(c). Rule 65 1(c) provides:
Upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a post-conviction proceeding, if the trial
court determines that the petitioner is indigent, it shall order that a transcript of the
record of the post-conviction proceedings, including a transcript of the evidence, if
any, be prepared and filed with the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken and
shall appoint counsel on appeal, both without cost to the petitioner. The record filed in
that court shall contain a showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner's
attorney, that the attorney has consulted with petitioner either by mail or in person to
ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional right, has examined the
record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made amendments to the petitions filed
pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's contentions.
Id. (emphasis added).
308. See People v. Turner, 719 N.E.2d 725, 728-30 (I11. 1999) (capital case).
309. Id. at 729. Turner also held that the requirement under Rule 65 1(c), that counsel consult
with the petitioner, may be satisfied even if they only meet once. Id. at 728.
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comparable coverage for professionally drafted post-conviction
petitions." 310
B. Lack of Fitness Hearing as a Basis for Post-Conviction Relief
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of
whether the lack of a fitness hearing was cognizable in a post-
conviction proceeding. In People v. Burt, the defendant argued that the
record at trial established a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand
trial.311 Consequently, he argued his attorneys were ineffective for
failing to request a fitness hearing. 312 The court rejected the petitioner's
claim that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to ask for a
fitness hearing. 313 The court looked at its previous holding on the issue
in People v. Mitchell.314 The majority in Mitchell reasoned that because
defendant's right to a section 104-21 (a) fitness hearing is statutory and
not constitutional, failure to receive a fitness hearing is not a
constitutional deprivation. 315 As such, failure to receive a section 104-
21(a) fitness hearing is not cognizable in a petition for post-conviction
relief unless it is framed in the context of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 316
The court in Burt also explained that for a defendant to prevail on a
claim that his trial counsel's failure to request a fitness hearing
amounted to incompetence of counsel, the "defendant must show that
facts existed at the time of his trial that would raise a bonafide doubt of
his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and
to assist his defense." 317 Relevant factors for a court to consider when
determining whether a bona fide doubt exists include the defendant's
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion
on the defendant's competence to stand trial.318 The defendant is
entitled to post-conviction relief "only if he shows that the trial court
310. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 100, 109-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (non-
capital case) (affirming trial court's summary dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition
holding that it was beyond the scope of Rule 651 (c)).
311. People v. Burt, No. 86898, 2001 WL 1243631, at *4 (111. Oct. 18, 2001) (capital case).
312. Id. at *4.
313. Id. at*5.
314. Id. at *4 (citing People v. Mitchell, 727 N.E.2d 254 (11. 2000) (capital case)).
315. Mitchell, 727 N.E.2d at 267.
316. Burt, 2001 WL 1243631, at *4 (citing Mitchell, 727 N.E.2d at 269).
317. Id. at *5 (quoting People v. Easley, 736 N.E.2d 975, 985 (Il1. 2000) (capital case)).
318. Id. (citing Easley, 736 N.E.2d at 986).
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would have found a bona fide doubt of his fitness and ordered a fitness
hearing if it had been apprised of the evidence now offered. ' 319
Finally, counsel's alleged failure to amend a previous post-conviction
petition to include the allegation of petitioner's lack of fitness, due to
the ingestion of psychotropic drugs at or near the time of trial and
sentencing, does not support a claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 320 This holding resulted
because the alleged failure did not occur in the proceedings that resulted
in the conviction and was thus beyond the scope of the Act.321
C. Actual Innocence and DNA
In People v. Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue
of actual innocence claims and DNA in the context of post-conviction
petitions. 322 In Johnson, the capital defendant appealed the dismissal of
his first amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. 323 The court
held that "[a] claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence may be raised in a post-conviction petition." 324 The newly
discovered evidence, however, must, in fact, be new, material,
noncumulative, and so conclusive that it would probably change the
result at retrial. 325 The court went on to say that the defendant in that
case had not provided evidence of actual innocence. 326 Rather, the
defendant had asserted that DNA testing would have provided such
evidence. 327 The court then addressed the issue of whether DNA
testing can be granted as post-conviction relief when it was unavailable
319. Id. (quoting EasleY, 736 N.E.2d at 985 (citing People v. Johnson, 700 N.E.2d 996, 1005
(Ill. 1998) (capital case); People v. Eddmonds, 578 N.E.2d 952, 956-57 (111. 1991) (capital case)).
320. People v. Jones, 747 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001); see also People v.
Barrow, 749 N.E.2d 892, 912 (I11.) (capital case) (holding that a defendant's contention that he
was entitled to a fitness hearing due to use of psychotropic drugs during a trial could not provide
a basis for post-conviction relief), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001); People v. Jones, 730
N.E.2d 26, 28-29 (111. 2000) (capital case) (holding a defendant's post-conviction petition to be
procedurally defaulted).
321. Jones, 747 N.E.2d at 1078.
322. People v. Johnson, No. 85134, 2002 WL 592153, at *4-5 (11. Apr. 18. 2002) (capital
case).
323. Id. at*l.
324. Id. at *5; see People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (I11. 1996) (non-capital case)
(holding that newly discovered evidence going to defendant's innocence is cognizable as a matter
of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence); see also People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 840 (I11. 1998)
(capital case) ("An important goal of the criminal justice process is the protection of the innocent
accused against an erroneous conviction.").
325. Johnson, 2002 WL 592153, at *5 (citing People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 401 (I11.
1984) (non-capital case)).
326. Id.
327. Id.
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at trial.328 Consequently, the court granted defendant's DNA request
based on statutory grounds and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
329
In People v. Harris, the defendant argued that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of actual innocence. 330 The defendant
based his claim upon the affidavits of two co-defendants who said that
the defendant was not present at the time of the crime and that they
conspired to frame the defendant. 331  The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the defendant's claim of actual
innocence without an evidentiary hearing. 332  The court first held that
the affidavits of the defendant's brothers were not "newly discovered
evidence" because the defendant was the source of this information, and
it could have been discovered sooner. 333 The court then addressed the
co-defendants' affidavits and held that, in light of the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, the affidavits of the co-defendants were not of such a
conclusive character that they would have probably changed the
outcome on retrial. 334
D. Witness Recantations, Undisclosed Benefits, and the Knowing Use
of Perjured Testimony
Generally, a witness's recantation of his or her prior testimony is
regarded as inherently unreliable, and a court will not grant a new trial
on that basis except in extraordinary circumstances. 335 In addition,
328. Id.
329. Id. at *5-7. The United States Constitution provides access to exculpatory evidence on
collateral review. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995) (holding that petitioner's claim
is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding). See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963). We need not reach the constitutional issue, however, because 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/116-3 provides an answer to the defendant's request. People v. Dunn, 713 N.E.2d 568, 571 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999).
330. People v. Harris, No. 89796, 2002 WL 1340896, at *2 (I11. June 20, 2002) (capital case).
33 1. Id. Co-defendants had given detailed statements to the police shortly after their arrest,
implicating themselves and identifying defendant as the shooter. Id. Defendant also based his
claim on the affidavits of his brothers who stated that defendant was at home with them at the
time of the shooting. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335, 1345 (I11. 1997) (capital case); see also People v.
Nash, 222 N.E.2d 473, 478 (111. 1966) (non-capital case) (finding a trial judge's rejection of a
witness's recanted testimony when considering a motion for a new trial to be justified because the
recanting affidavit was "evasive, self-contradicting, unresponsive and in many respects highly
improbable"); People v. Caldwell, 579 N.E.2d 16, 19 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (rejecting a
defendant's contention that the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the defendant a
new trial despite a witness's recanted testimony).
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recantation evidence, standing alone, does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation that would entitle the petitioner to post-
conviction relief.336  There are circumstances, however, where a
witness's recantation may be the basis for post-conviction relief.
If a recantation contains allegations that a witness did not truthfully
testify regarding whether he or she received consideration in exchange
for his cooperation with the prosecutor, and the prosecutor allowed the
perjured testimony to go uncorrected, a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to substantiate these allegations. The seminal case
in this area is Napue v. lllinois. 337 In Napue, the principal state witness
testified that he had received no promise of consideration in return for
his testimony. 338 The witness, however, in fact had been promised such
consideration, and the prosecutor did nothing to correct this false
testimony. 339 The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and held that the defendant was entitled to post-conviction relief.340
The Court further held that the knowing use of false evidence to obtain
a conviction is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. 341  The same principle applies where the State, although not
soliciting the false testimony, allows such testimony to go
uncorrected. 342 These principles apply even where the witness's false
testimony goes only to the witness's credibility.343 Illinois courts have
336. See People v. Brown, 660 N.E.2d 964, 970 (I11. 1995) (non-capital case) ("In the absence
of an allegation of the knowing use of false testimony, or at least some lack of diligence on the
part of the State, there has been no involvement by the State in the false testimony to establish a
violation of due process. Without such involvement, the action of a witness falsely testifying is
an action of a private individual for which there is no remedy under the due process clause."
(citation omitted)).
337. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
338. Id. at 265.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 272.
341. Id. at 269.
342. Id.
343. Id. The court stated:
First, it is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence,
known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false
testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty,
does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility
of the witness .... It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness"
credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt.
Id. (citations omitted).
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consistently applied the reasoning in Napue.344 The courts have also
applied Napue to undisclosed monetary compensation and other
benefits.34
5
As noted earlier, in the absence of an allegation of the knowing use of
false testimony, or at least some lack of diligence on the part of the
State, there is no due process violation.346 Further, the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that the mere allegation of a State's witness receiving
consideration is not enough to require an evidentiary hearing.3 47  If the
petitioner can establish that an agent or representative of the State had
such knowledge, however, then a due process violation may be
established. 348 If the petitioner fails to raise the issue of knowing use of
perjured testimony in his original or amended petition, the issue is
waived.349 Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the plain error rule
may not be invoked for the defendant's failure to raise the issue.
350
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to analyze how recent decisions of the
courts of review in Illinois have impacted the standards and procedures
employed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. When analyzing
cases interpreting the Act, practitioners should not only focus on the
facts of the case but also consider the procedural stage at which the case
344. See People v. Olinger, 680 N.E.2d 321, 331 (Ill. 1997) (capital case). The court in
People v. Olinger remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the State's
witness testified falsely when he said he was only given immunity on one case. Id. at 331-32.
But see People v. Lucas, where the court cited the overwhelming evidence in holding that "the
instant case does not present facts which demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony affected the judgment against him." People v. Lucas, No. 89458, 2002 WL
31839191, at *11 (I11. Dec. 19, 2002) (capital case). "Because defendant did not establish
materiality, the circuit court correctly dismissed the defendant's claim without an evidentiary
hearing." Id.
345. See People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335, 1345 (111. 1997) (capital case) (remanding the
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was disposed and the language of the pertinent section of the Act. The
practitioner should remember that many of the cases cited in support of
the position taken in an opinion addressed issues arising in procedural
stages different than that of the case on appeal. This difference occurs
because the Act treats capital cases differently from cases where the
defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Similarly, cases
decided before the effective date of section 122-2.1, requiring the trial
court to review all petitions and to dismiss those which are frivolous or
patently without merit, are of little value when reviewing summary
dismissals. Finally, the practitioner should look at the type of
documentation the defendant attached in support of his or her post-
conviction petition. A careful reading of the cases, noting the
distinctions mentioned above, will clarify many apparent conflicts in the
case law.
The Illinois Supreme Court has addressed many of these conflicts in
recent years. The court has clarified the different standards of review
for summary dismissals (de novo) and dismissals after evidentiary
hearings (manifestly erroneous); what constitutes a 'conviction' for
purposes of the period of limitations for section 122-1(c); and, most
recently, the impropriety of summarily dismissing a petition as untimely
without a motion by the State asserting these grounds. It is abundantly
clear, however, that, while the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed
many issues arising under the Post-Conviction Act, the justices are
sharply divided in their analyses and suggested solutions. Thus, they
will undoubtedly address the Act in many more cases in the near future.
Similarly, the appellate courts have issued many decisions analyzing
issues under the Act, and this veritable flood of cases will continue
unabated for the foreseeable future. If the trial courts in Illinois and the
attorneys who practice before them are to have any hope of addressing
these cases in a timely and consistent manner, they must keep abreast of
the cases issued by courts of review in Illinois. Hopefully, this Article
will be of some assistance in carrying out this Herculean task.
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